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Abstract 
 
This paper examines socio-historical roots of the emergence of the idea of “Islamic 
Protestantism” within Iranian Shi’i tradition. The central focus of this study is to 
present thoughts and activities of so-called “Iranian Luthers” as the agents, actors, 
and prime movers of the birth of Islamic reformation in Iran. These actors whose 
ideas of Islamic reformation have had great influences and reached broader 
audiences beyond Iranian territory include Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Ali 
Shari’ati, Mehdi Bazargan, Hashem Aghajari, and Abdul Karim Soroush. There are 
a number of Iranian reformers deserve credits for their thoughtful, controversial 
ideas of Islamic reformations. These Iranian reformers are considered “the 
Luthers of Islam” for their deep admiration of Martin Luther’s Protestant 
Reformation, and their calls for Islamic reformation just like Luther did in the 
sixteenth century Europe. By the socio-historical and descriptive analysis, this 
paper is not intended to compare two religious reformations in Iran and Europe, 
but rather to study and analyze their notions with regard to Islamic reformation.  
*** 
Artikel ini membicarakan tentang akar sosio-historis munculnya gagasan 
“Protestanisme Islam” dalam tradisi Syi’ah Iran, dengan fokus kajian pemikiran dan 
gerakan yang disebut “Luther Iran” sebagai agen, aktor, dan penggerak utama 
lahirnya reformasi Islam di Iran. Ide-ide reformasi Islam memiliki pengaruh besar 
dan mencapai khalayak yang lebih luas di luar wilayah Iran termasuk Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, Ali Shari’ati, Mehdi Bazargan, Hashem Aghajari, dan Abdul Karim 
Soroush. Sejumlah reformis Iran layak mendapatkan perhatian karena pemikiran, 
ide-ide kontroversial mereka dalam reformasi Islam. Para reformis Iran dianggap 
sebagai “Luther Islam” karena kekaguman mendalam mereka terhadap Martin 
Luther, dan mereka menghendaki reformasi Islam seperti yang terjadi pada masa 
Luther di Eropa abad keenam belas. Dengan analisis sosio-historis dan deskriptif, 
tulisan ini tidak dimaksudkan untuk membandingkan dua reformasi keagamaan di 
Iran dan Eropa, melainkan untuk mempelajari dan menganalisis gagasan-gagasan 
mereka mengenai reformasi Islam. 
Keywords: Iranian Shi’i Tradition, Iranian Luthers, Islamic reformation, 
Islamic Protestantism 
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A. Foreword: Early Generations of Iranian Reformers 
The idea of “Islamic Protestantism” has become a hot topic in many 
Muslim societies including those of Iranian Shiites. In Iran, for instance, Dr. 
Hashem Aghajari (b. 1957), a journalist and active member of the reformist 
Islamic Revolution’s Mujahideen Organization (IRMO), suddenly became an 
international celebrity after speaking on this issue in June 2002 on the 
occasions to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the death of Ali Shari’ati 
(b. 1933), one of the main ideologues of the Islamic Revolution. In his speech, 
besides criticizing Iran’s ruling religious institution, Aghajari, a disabled 
veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, presented the ideas of Islamic reformation. Built 
on the basis of Shari’ati’s legacy as an intellectual legitimacy, he specifically 
called for the need to rejuvenate Islam with the fresh notions of so-called 
“Islamic Protestantism”.  
Aghajari used Shari’ati’s legacy to express his own criticism with regard to 
the hegemonic role and practices of clerical establishments in post-Islamic 
Revolution Iran. He saw religion in the Islamic Republic of Iran had become 
bureaucratized and hierarchical. Because of his strong criticism, he was 
arrested by the Iranian government in August 2002. No more than three 
months later, which was on November 6, 2002, he was sentenced to death by a 
Hamedan court for (the accusation of) being apostate, blaspheming the Prophet 
Muhammad, insulting the Shi’ite imams, and “mocking” top state religious 
authorities. In 2004, after domestic Iranian and international outcry, his 
sentence was reduced to time in prison. It is significant to acknowledge that 
Aghajari is not the first and the only Iranian thinker that advocates the idea of 
Islamic Protestantism. Additionally, such an idea is not unique Iranian Shi’a. The 
ideas of Islamic restoration have also been advocated by non-Iranian Muslim 
scholars, reformist ulama’, and activists across the Muslim world.1 
______________ 
1 See e.g. Arkoun, 2006; Bayat 2007; Kurzman, ed. 1998; Safi, ed. 2003; Abou El Fadl 2005; 
Esposito and Tamimi, eds. 2000; Noer 1973; Esack 1998. Another eminent Muslim thinker joins in 
this camp is Syrian author Muhammad Shahrour (b. 1938). Dale Eickelman in his article, “Islamic 
Liberalism Strikes Back,” states that a best-selling 1990 book by him, that is, Al-Kitab wa ’l-Qur’an: 
Qira’a Mu’asira (“The Book and the Qur’an: A Contemporary Reading”), “may one day be seen as a 
Muslim equivalent of the 95 Theses that Martin Luther nailed to the door of the Wittenberg Castle 
Church in 1517” (Dale Eickelman, “Islamic Liberalism Strikes Back.” MESA Bulletin, No. 27, 1993, pp. 
163-168). Through this book, Shahrour provokingly argues the need for reinterpretation of the 
Qur’an with new lens and modern social sciences such as linguistics and hermeneutics to grasp the 
whole picture of the Qur’an, and not through the prism of centuries of jurisprudence. In his other 
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The emergence of the notion of Islamic Protestantism was deeply rooted 
within Islamic history, especially since the late nineteenth century, when 
some Muslim modernists and Arab-the Middle East nationalist leaders called 
for Islamic reformation by referring the fifteenth Christian Reformation led 
by, notably, Martin Luther (d. 1546), to liberate Muslim societies from 
European colonial handcuffing and despotic Muslim empire.2 However, 
although both camps—the modernists and the nationalists—shared the same 
fascination toward the Christian Reformation, they had different stand points 
regarding whether the Christian Reformation resembled Islam or the reverse: 
the developments in Christian history that resembled Islam. Thinkers like 
Muhammad Abduh of Egypt (d. 1905), Muhammad Iqbal of India (d. 1938), 
and Ziya Gokalp of Turkey (d. 1924), to name several Muslim modernists, 
tended to see the resemblance of the Christian Reformation to Islam. On the 
contrary, nationalist figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and other 
reformists such as Indian reformer Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) advocated 
the need for the spirit of the Christian Reformation and Luther to lead Islamic 
reformation. This call then was echoed by Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadah (d. 1878) in 
the Russian Empire and Abdullah Cevdet (d. 1932) of Ottoman Empire, both 
of whom used the Christian Reformation analogy as a cover for atheism.3  
______________ 
book, Dirasat al-Islāmiyya Mu’asira fi ’l-Daula wa ’l-Mujtama’ (“Contemporary Islamic Studies in State 
and Societies”), Shahrour also demands Muslims to not blindly follow the conception and thoughts of 
medieval jurists Muslims (Eickelman in Browers and Kurzman, eds. 2004, p. 20). Sudanese Muslim 
academician and activist Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na’im (b. 1946) also has echoed the idea of Islamic 
reformation. However he stated that an Islamic reformation cannot be a belated and poor copy of the 
European Christian model of Reformation. Instead, it will have to be an indigenous and authentically 
Islamic process. By his book, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and 
International Law, al-Na’im is an important voice for calling Islamic reformation by reformulating the 
structure of “liberal shari’a” identified by granting civil liberties, respecting basic human rights, 
minority rights (particularly non-Muslims), equality under law, and so forth. In an attempt to 
reconstruct this “new sha’ria,” he evokes the use of Mecca verses of the Qur’an, which is, according to 
him, more liberal, plural, and democratic (see al-Na’im, 1996). Moreover, Ahmad Bishara, the 
chairman of the National Democratic Movement of Kuwait, can be regarded as the supporter of this 
movement when he said that the aim of the political party he established was to “reform Islam the 
way Martin Luther reformed the Catholic Church.” Kenyan thinkers Ali Mazuri and Alamin Mazrui 
also pondered that “It would be particularly fitting if the Martin Luther of the Islamic Reformation 
turned out to be a woman, posting her 95 Theses of reform not on the door of a Wittenberg mosque 
but universally on the Internet” (cited from Michaelle Browers and Charles Kurzman (eds.), An 
Islamic Reformation? Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004, pp. 6-7. cf. Sumanto al-Qurtuby, “Calling for an 
Islamic Protestantism: Toward Democratic and Pluralistic Islam.” International Journal of Islamic 
Studies 2 (2). Forthcoming, 2008. 
2 I have explained elsewhere on this issue. See Qurtuby 2008; cf. Hourani 1962; Shadid 2002. 
3 The call for the need of Islamic reformation goes further. Habib Allah Puri Riza (Iran) argued 
that Shi’i Islam needed a “sacred revolution” “with thinkers like Luther and Calvin; Muhammad 
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With regard to my purpose, I will limit this discussion only to that of Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897). And indeed, he was the most prominent and 
leading advocate of the concept of Islamic Protestantism as a way to liberate 
Muslim societies and countries from Western imperialism and Muslim despots. 
Afghani’s revolutionary ideas had influenced many notable Muslim scholars 
and activists, including Abduh (d. 1905), Rida (d. 1935), and al-Kawakibi. Abd 
al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (born in Syria, 1849-1902) wrote Taba’i al-Istibdad 
(“The Characterization of Tyranny”), which was translated into Persian and had 
some influences on Iranian intelligentsia, particularly Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabataba’i at the time of Constitutional Revolution.4 Born in Iran as Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, he then used and replaced his last-name to become “al-
Afghani” in order to achieve broader acceptance and influence among Sunni 
Muslims in Arab and the Middle East particularly.5 Afghani perceived Islam not 
just as a religion but as comprehensive civilization. Albert Hourani noted that 
the idea of civilization is one of the seminal ideas of nineteenth-century Europe, 
and “it is through al-Afghani above all that it reaches the Islamic world.”6 
To Afghani, Islam was seen as profoundly activist and rational, influencing 
its believers to resist against colonialism and despotism. As well, he regarded 
Islam and its believers as the dynamic historical entities that always shifted 
from stupidity and brutalism toward a more advanced, learned civilization. 
______________ 
Rashid Rida (d. 1935) cited the need to merge “religious renewal and earthly renewal, the same way 
Europe has done with religious reformation and modernization;” Hadi Atlasi (d. 1940) claimed the 
urgent need for a Muslim “Luther” to save the Muslim world, and he considered Shihabuddin 
Marjani (d. 1889), the founder of Islamic modernism in Russia, as the “Muslim Luther” (see more at 
Browers and Kurzman, eds. 2004, ibid., p. 1-17; Hourani, 1983; Kurzman ed. 1998). In Indonesia, 
according to Deliar Noer in his The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, the call for Islamic 
reformation was advocated by Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah organization, Haji 
Miskin and Imam Bonjol in Minangkabau, the founders of Indonesian Wahhabism, and also 
Muhammad Natsir, “the opponent” of Soekarno, leading advocate of Indonesian secularism and 
nationalism, during the nationalist movement era (Noer 1978). This Islamic reformation movement, 
according to the secularist Syrian thinker Sadiq Jalal al-‘Azm, had caused the establishment of a 
counterreformation movements led by the Ikhwanul Muslimin in 1928 (?) and similar movements 
(Browers and Kurzman, eds. 2004, ibid., p. 5). In the Indonesian context, the modernist movements 
had stimulated the founding of the Islamic traditionalist organization, Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, led 
by Syeikh Hasyim Asy’ari, the grandfather of Gus Dur (cf. Qurtuby 2008). 
4 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran, (London 
and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2003), p. 102. 
5 Nikkie R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: a Political Biography, (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 11. 
6 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1962), p. 114. 
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According to him, Islam should be “divested of its particular political divisions, 
and should unite in one pan-Islamic movement against the West”.7 In particular, 
al-Afghani viewed Muslim rulers as weak, fragile, and susceptible to foreign 
(western) exploitation and manipulation. Accordingly, in his view, Islam should 
be freed from “the corrupt and deliberating accretions of the past centuries and 
return to the purity and strengthen of its early years of Islam”.8 Due to his desire 
to “purify” Islam with the lens of early Islam developed by the Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions, Wilfred Cantwell Smith once noticed that 
Afghani was the first important Muslim figure with “nostalgia for departed 
earthly glory of pristine Islam. “Smith further notes that Afghani stressed both 
internal reform and external defense, encouraged both nationalism and pan-
Islam, and advocated borrowing from the West and a new vitalistic activism.9 
Although he did not present a detailed program of institutional change, he 
sought to inspire movements to restore the political institutions of Islam.  
Afghani was a prototype of a rational Muslim thinker and activist, who 
utilizes Islamic philosophy as a means of “knowledge to transform Islamic 
society from the state of barbarism to scientific progress and from darkness 
into light”.10 Rejecting unthinking traditionalism and blind imitation of the 
West, Afghani began to reinterpret Islam by emphasizing “values vitally needed 
for life in modern world such as activism, the freer use of human reason, and 
political and military strength”.11 Apart from the tradition of Islamic philosophy, 
al-Afghani’s passion in reason is in part due to the influence of the historical 
writings of the French historian Francois Guizot (1787-1847).12 His lectures on 
the history of civilization (his work was translated into Arabic in 1877) had 
impressed Afghani.  
Particularly, Afghani was inspired by Guizot’s concepts of reason and 
social solidarity as a basis of advancement within western tradition. Influenced 
by this idea, Afghani then suggested reinterpreting Islam in light of reason, 
______________ 
7 Vanesa Martin, Creating an Islamic State...., pp. 100-101. 
8 Ibid., p. 101. 
9 Smith, 1957, pp. 47-51. 
10 Sukidi, “The Travelling Idea of Islamic Protestantism: a Study of Iranian Luthers.” Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations 16 (4), 2005, p. 403. 
11 Nikkie R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, (Berkeley, CA: Univiversity of California Press, 1968), p. 3. 
12 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, pp. 114-115. 
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progress, and civilization rather than a set of religious teachings and doctrines. 
This appeal for reinterpreting Islam and the Qur’an with regard to these reason, 
progress, and civilization, has argued, could lead towards a Protestant-type of 
Islamic reform.13 Having learned from Martin Luther, who openly defied and 
resisted the dominant authority of Catholic religious establishments, Afghani 
began to challenge the hegemonic authority of conservative and traditional 
ulama’ which he saw as the root causes of decadence and decline in Islamic 
civilization for centuries. Afghani’s fascination towards Luther was indicated by 
his statements as follows:  
“If we consider the reasons for the transformation in the condition of 
Europe from barbarism to civilization, we see it was only the religious 
movement raised and spread by Luther. This great man, when he saw 
that the peoples of Europe had declined and lost their vigor due to the 
long period that they had submitted to the heads of the church and to 
(religious) imitation, not based on clear reason, started that religious 
movement…”14  
In short, it is obvious that Afghani was an admirer of Luther, and he often 
considered himself as a Martin Luther who learned from the “success” of 
Protestant Reformation as the point of reference for his notion of Islamic 
Protestantism. He strongly argued that Islam needed Luthers in order to 
attain a Protestant-style of Islamic reform.15 He, furthermore, proposed that 
the Islamic Protestantism should be based on two fundamental principles: (1) 
Muslim societies should directly return to the Qur’an as a primary basis of 
Islam; and (2) the significance of the revitalization of ijtihād as the main 
vehicle of achieving the advancement of Muslim societies, and of liberating 
them from backwardness and ignorance. 
Afghani’s progressive ideas of Islamic reformation based upon rational 
thinking and the spirit of freedom was continued by Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977), 
one of the main ideologues of the Iranian Islamic Revolution; albeit he died 
before the 1978-1979 Revolution took place. Born in Mazinan, a village near 
Mashad in northeast Iran, Shari’ati, whose life was under close surveillance of 
Iran’s secret police and conservative clerics, was a complex figure combining 
______________ 
13 Nikkie R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism… p. 38. 
14 Nikkie R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani… pp. 391-92. 
15 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, p. 122. 
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a sociologist, “Islamic Marxist,” public speaker, and devout believer of Shiism. 
He underwent the “same fate” with his father, Muhammad Taqi Shari’ati16, a 
respected reformist cleric, who, ironically, was labeled by his Shi’i fellows as a 
Sunni, a Bahai, and even Wahhabi. Indeed, Shari’ati himself proudly stated 
that his father, more than anyone else, had influenced his intellectual 
advance.17 Shari’ati prolific period did not last long, for in 1972 the secret 
police surrounded Houssein-e-Ershad Institute ceased his activities and 
arrested many of his followers.18 Intellectual hacks hired by the government 
accused Shari’ati of “leading youth astray with anti-clerical propaganda.” Even 
Ayatollah Mottaheri, who was considered as a reform-minded cleric, viewed 
Shari’ati was too emphasizing sociology “at the expense of theology and 
borrowing too freely from Western political philosophy”.19  
Like his predecessors, notably Afghani, Shari’ati was an admirer of the 
Christian Reformation of the sixteenth century Europe. He argued that 
contemporary Iran (read, Iran under the Shah Pahlavi) was at a similar stage of 
development as pre-Reformation Europe; consequently Iran needed 
progressive figures such as Luther and Calvin to embark on Islamic reformation 
by promoting enlightening and liberating ideas for Islam and Muslim societies 
as a whole. Following Afghani’s call for a return to the Qur’an through liberal 
and rational interpretations, Shari’ati also called for a return to a “true Islam” 
which he defined as an Islam that not only pros toward the oppressed, the 
exploited, and the marginalized people (mustaḍ‘afīn)20 but also demands its 
believers to struggle against the oppressors for the sake of justice. He states:  
It is not enough to say we must return to Islam. We must specify which 
Islam: that of Abu Zarr or that of Marwan the ruler. Both are called 
______________ 
16 Muhammad Taqi Shari’ati dedicated his life to both “defending Islam and defining the 
outlines of a ‘revived’ Islam compatible with modern conditions and responsive to the demands of an 
ever more socially conscious youth” [Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali 
Shari’ati, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), p. 12]. His reform efforts were 
resisted by Iranian conservative clerics who still upheld traditional forms of Islam.  
17 Ibid., pp. 11-22. 
18 See the official website of Dr. Ali Shari’ati at: http://www.shariati.com  
19 Ervand Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution.” MERIP Reports No. 
102, 1982, pp. 25. 
20 It is important to note that the Qur’an mentions the term of mustadh’afin (the oppressed) 
seventeen times more than that of, for instance, kubara’ (elites), mala’ (noblemen, political leaders), 
or mutrafun (the greedy rich people) (see e.g. Rakhmat 1997). From this standpoint, Shari’ati’s claim 
that Islam is the religion of the oppressed has found its relevance.  
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Islamic, but there is a huge difference between them. One is the Islam of 
the Caliphate, of the Palace, of the Rulers [read, Islam of Marwan]. The 
other [read, Islam of Abu Zarr] is the Islam of the people, of the exploited, 
and of the poor. Moreover, it is not good enough to say that one should be 
‘concerned’ about the poor. The corrupt Caliphs said the same. True 
Islam is more than ‘concerned’. It instructs the believer to fight for justice, 
equality, and elimination of poverty” (Islamology, Lesson 3, pp. 7-8).21    
Based upon the above statements, Shari’ati evidently understood Islam as 
a religion that encourages and commands a sort of dynamism, resistance, and 
activism. He viewed Islam as a “liberating force” of human societies from 
despotism (istibdad), colonialism (isti’mar), exploitation (istitsmar) and so forth. 
He based this idea on the most fundamental concept within Islamic tradition: 
tawḥīd (literally “oneness”). It is interesting to highlight that Bazargan also 
underlined the significance of tawḥīd, verbally known as “There is no god but 
God” (lā ilāha illa-Allāh), as a foundation of “Islamic liberation.” He even went 
further by saying that tauhid is the mission of the prophets that has been “to 
liberate human beings, not to enslave them”.22  
For Shari’ati, moreover, tawḥīd does not simply a statement of “oneness of 
God” (unity of Godhead) as Muslim communities commonly believe, but rather 
a declaration of unity of creation (tawḥīd al-khulq), and finally, of unity of 
mankind (tawḥīd al-ummat) based upon the precepts of justice (‘adalah), 
equality (musawah), and liberty or freedom (ḥurriyah). Here Shari’ati 
contended that the concept of tawḥīd is a mirror or symbol of struggle to 
accomplish what Marx called “classless society”.23 This theological awareness 
strengthens that Islam rejects all kinds of exploitation, discrimination, and 
oppression against human beings. Shari’ati continued to argue that Muslims are 
not truly considered to be “Islamic” (read, “true Islam” in the light of Shari’ati) if 
they still “worship” other objects or creatures like wealth and power, or 
“idolize” other entities rather than God, such as kings, the rich, political rulers, 
clerics, the shah and so on.  
______________ 
21 Ervand Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution,” p. 27. 
22 Mehdi Bazargan, “Religion and Liberty,” in Kurzman (ed), Liberal Islam: A Source Book, 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 76. 
23 Shahrough Akhavi, “Shari’ati Social Thought.” In Nikkie R. Keddie (ed), Religion and Politic in 
Iran, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 125-144. 
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Shari’ati, considered by many as the ideological father of the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, often stressed that the Prophet Muhammad had been sent 
down by God to set up not just a religious/Islamic community but an ummat 
(human societies) as a whole in constant motion towards progress and social 
justice. Moreover, he argues that the Prophet Muhammad’s intention was to 
build not just a monotheistic religion but a unitary society (nezam-i-tawhid) 
that would be bound together by public virtue, by the common struggle for 
fairness, egalitarianism, and human brotherhood.24 In order to achieve the 
Weber-borrowed “ideal type” of that “true Islam,” Shari’ati has argued, Islam 
must be taught, raised and spread by the “enlightened thinkers” (rushanfekran) 
who, on one hand, opposed the corrupt clerics and the hegemonic role of clergy, 
and on the other hand, struggled for rational, modern, and dynamic views of 
Islam. Shari’ati regarded this rushanfekran as the real advocates of dynamic, 
vibrant, and revolutionary Islam.25  
Viewing the Iranian environment which was colored by social hierarchy, 
religious exploitation, and political mistreatment, Shari’ati seemed to argue that 
the rushanfekran could play a similar role to the Christian reformers Martin 
Luther (1483-1546) and John Calvin (1509-1564). Shari’ati, who keenly read 
the works of contemporary radicals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Franz Fanon, Che 
Guevara, and Roger Garaudy (a leading Christian Marxist intellectual), believed 
that Islam in general and Iranian Islam in particular required a radical 
reformation and fundamental restoration. Specifically, he insisted upon the 
need of the model provided by Luther and Calvin for transferring and trans-
forming the establishment of the Iranian clerical institution (rūhaniyyat) to the 
leadership of those rushanfekran.26  
For Shari’ati, the rushanfekran, indeed have the task of creating an 
“Islamic Protestantism” for the sake of “cultural engineering, stimulating the 
political and class consciousness of the masses, building bridges between the 
intellectual stratum and the masses, defrocking false priests, and, in a word, 
______________ 
24 See Abrahamian 1982; cf. Rahnema 1998. 
25 See more Ali Shari’ati, What is to be Done? The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic 
Renaissance, edited by F. Rajaee. Houston, TX: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986, p. 29-
67. 
26 Sukidi, “The Travelling Idea of Islamic Protestantism… p. 406. cf. Rahnema: 1998. 
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ushering in a Renaissance”.27 The replacement of the clerics with the 
rushanfekran is critical since the clerics, Shari’ati maintained, had become an 
integral part of the ruling class, of “institutionalizing” revolutionary Shi’ism, 
and thereby betraying its original goals. He also blamed them for failing to 
carry on the work of such 19th century reformers as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
with regard to Islamic Protestantism. In his lecture at the Technical University 
of Tehran in November 1971, he began to call publicly for Islamic 
Protestantism as follows:  
He [an enlightened person, the rushanfekran] should begin by an Islamic 
Protestantism, similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, 
destroying all the degenerating factors which, in the name of Islam, have 
stymied and stupefied the process of thinking and the fate of the society, 
and giving to the new thoughts and new movements.28 
By embracing the concept of Islamic Protestantism which underlines the 
pivotal role of rational, critical, and independent reasoning (ijtihād),29 has 
argued, Iranian Muslims could liberate themselves from the destructive 
political intervention of the Shah’s regime and the dominant role of the ruling 
clerics. In the hands of Shari’ati, who translated Guevara’s Guerilla Warfare 
and Sartre’s What Is Poetry?, the call for Islamic Protestantism had become a 
public statement compared with what Afghani had previously initiated in the 
late nineteenth century. His passion and vision to implement Islam as a 
“liberating force,” a sort of the Christian Reformation, had succeeded to 
inspire and awake Iranian Muslims, regardless of their religious de-
nominations and ethnic affiliations, in toppling the Reza Shah Pahlavi regime 
in a remarkable revolution in 1979. Iranian protestors during the historic 
event of the “Islamic Revolution” carried out the giant posters of both Imam 
Khomeini and Dr. Ali Shari’ati. Although he died prior to the Revolution, his 
ideas of “Islamic Protestantism” never die. In fact, present-day “Iranian 
Luthers,” notably Hashem Aghajari and Abdulkarim Soroush, have persisted 
Shari’ati’s concepts and struggle to implement the fresh ideas of Islamic 
reformation in post-”Islamic Revolution” Iran.  
______________ 
27 Akhavi in Keddie, ed, op. cit., p. 137. 
28 Ali Shari’ati, What is to be Done? ..., pp. 24-25. 
29 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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B. Post-Revolutionary Iranian Luthers 
Post-revolutionary Iranian Luthers include three well-known scholars 
and influential reformists, namely Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1995), Hashem 
Aghajari (1957-), and Abdul Karim Soroush (1945-). It is somewhat difficult 
to place Bazargan and Soroush in the camp of post-revolutionary Iranian 
reformers since they undergo and live in two different worlds of Iranian 
politics: during the Shah and the Mullah regimes. Furthermore, to some 
degree, Bazargan should be placed as one of the early generations of pre-
revolutionary Iranian reformers, along with Shari’ati.30 However, since he 
witnessed the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and became a strong critic of the 
Mullah-controlled Iranian regime, I position Bazargan in the cluster of post-
revolutionary Iranian reformers. I will discuss Bazargan first and then 
followed by Aghajari and Soroush.  
Born into a devout family of merchants, Bazargan was a French trained 
engineer, a lay Islamic scholar, and a long-time pro-democracy activist whose 
efforts in democratizing the Shi’i clerical establishment since the early 1960s 
led him as “a barely tolerated symbol of opposition to the radical-Islamic 
government”.31 Bazargan was not only critical toward the Mullah regime of 
post-revolutionary Iran, but also prior to the historic “Islamic Revolution” 
took place in 1979, he strongly opposed to the Shah Pahlavi regime. It is 
obvious that Bazargan represented a critical voice against the shahs of Iran 
whose nonviolent opposition to them through groups he cofounded such as 
the Liberation Movement of Iran (founded in 1961) and the Iranian Human 
Rights Association (founded in 1977) led him to the jail during the 1960s and 
1970s. When the shah was forced out of Iran in 1979 by people power, Imam 
Ruhollah Khomeini appointed Bazargan as provisional prime minister, but he 
resigned just within a year, complaining that conservative, radical clerics 
were destabilizing and opposing his rule. Harassed by his radical opposition, 
Bazargan then lived in a sort of political limbo until his death in early 1995. 
Abdulkarim Soroush, today’s most liberal philosopher in Iran, gave several 
______________ 
30 Note: Bazargan far older than Shari’ati but Shari’ati died prior to the Revolution so that he 
had no chance to witness the religious-political processes of post-revolutionary Iranian government, 
while Bazargan died in 1995.  
31 cf. Kurzman (ed), op. cit., p. 73 
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lectures about Bazargan after his death, praising him as a forerunner of 
Islamic reform.32 
This short description portrays Bazargan’s commitment toward the 
ideas of Islamic reformation and fundamental changes within Iranian politics 
and Islam which in-line with the spirits of human’s universal values and basic 
human rights. No doubt Bazargan was a central figure within the ranks of 
modern Muslim thinkers, well known as a representative of progressive 
Muslim thinkers who has emphasized the necessity of constitutional and 
democratic politics (cf. Barzin 1994). Bazargan’s basic concepts and notions 
about Islamic reform-related issues and the need for change within Iranian 
politics can be found, among others, in his seminal essay, “Religion and 
Liberty”.33 In this fine piece, Bazargan responds a speech about the European 
origins of the notion of freedom delivered by Ezzatallah Sahabi (Iran, b. 1932), 
the son of Bazargan’s long-time colleague Yadollah Sahabi (1905-2002), who 
was prominent Iranian scholar and reformist politician.  
Ezzatallah Sahabi argued that the roots of modern liberalism lie in the 
17th century, when the feudal rulers of Europe were struggling to liberate 
themselves from the hegemony of the pope and the Catholic Church. The 
movement culminated in the quest for social and political liberties demanded 
by the great French Revolution (1789-1799) and other democratic regimes, 
forerunners of which included Rousseau (d. 1778), Voltaire (d. 1778), 
Montesquieu (d. 1755), and other French philosophers of the eighteenth 
century (known Encyclopedists), who were typically anti-clerics, anti-church, 
and anti-religious. However, as Sahabi noted, the foundation of the European 
Renaissance was rooted in the religious reformation and Protestantism under 
the leadership of, notably, Martin Luther (d. 1546) and Calvin (d. 1564). 
Protestants aiming at returning Christianity to its pristine simplicity, 
spirituality, and liberty, rejected the superstitions and religious restrictions of 
Catholicism.  
For Bazargan, however, freedom came at birth far before Martin Luther 
declared the “95 Theses” he nailed to the door of the Wittenberg Castle Church 
______________ 
32 Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, translated and edited by 
Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 200.  
33 Bazargan, Religion and Liberty,” in Kurzman (ed), Liberal Islam:  pp. 73-84. 
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in 1517 to demand freedom from the monopoly interpretation and the 
supremacy of Catholic Church. More precisely, Bazargan has argued, Islam and 
Muslim societies underwent the “virtue” of freedom since the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the “rightful caliphs” (al-khulafā’ 
al-rāshidūn). Since the al-khulafā’ al-rāshidūn (read, the reign of Abu Bakar, 
Umar, Ustman, and Ali) ended, Islam and Muslim societies underwent a new 
era under the system of despotic caliphate (beginning with the Umayyad 
Dynasty). Since then, freedom became an “expensive thing.” Bazargan states:  
The caliphs were commanders in chief, supreme judges, and treasures. 
They considered themselves the embodiment of the Qur’anic verses: ‘O 
believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority 
among you’ (QS. [4]: 62). They thus claimed to be absolute sovereigns 
and autocrats. The farther we get from the early days of Islam, the more 
we encounter this kind of tyranny. After the rightful caliphs [the first four 
caliphs of Islam], the rights of citizens to criticize and disagree with their 
leaders was abrogated”.34 
Bazargan continued to argue that the Qur’an and Islam have lavished great 
respect and care on individual rights including freedom of expression and beliefs. 
The religious duty to “call others to virtue and warn them against vice” (amr al-
ma‘rūf nahy al-munkar?), to stand for justice and truth, Bazargan has asserted, 
assumes freedom of opinion and criticism. He said that Islam, as reflected it the 
Qur’an, grants different opinions even within the realm of the tenets of religion. 
For Bazargan, God has made freedom “in the very foundation of survival and 
revival in the world”.35 God may excuse disobedience against His law but, He 
cannot “forgive people for transgressing the rights of people”.36 Freedom, he 
added, “is not a luxury; it is a necessity. When freedom is banished, tyranny will 
take its place”.37 Since God grants liberty, no one on earth, including religious 
scholars and clerics, has a privilege right to limit human’s freedom in interpreting 
religious texts and teachings. Based upon the Qur’anic verses and Islamic 
mandate, he pointed out, the connection between God and the people is direct 
and unmediated. The role of the prophets, Imams, and ‘ulamā’ (clerics), he said, is 
merely to call people toward God and to make them responsible before Him (cf. 
______________ 
34 Ibid., p. 77. 
35 Ibid., p. 81. 
36 Ibid., p. 84. 
37 Ibid., p. 82. 
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Q. 12: 108; Q. 41: 5). There is no doubt that one should learn from those “who are 
better informed and more virtuous,” but this does not mean “relinquishing 
individual responsibility and freewill”.38  
It is central to bear in mind that for Bazargan, the difference of opinions 
is highly praised, referring the Prophet’s sayings: ikhtilāf al-ummatiy raḥmat 
(“dissimilarity of pinions among Muslims is blessing”), not only within 
individual contexts but also in the political domain. The Qur’anic texts, 
Bazargan affirms, undeniably propose that the affairs and government be 
based on ṣūrā (consultation) which praise various and distinct opinions and 
views (see e.g. Q. 42: 36-38, 41-43). In supporting his ideas, Bazargan not only 
quoted the Qur’an, but also referred to the practice of the Prophet 
Muhammad and Ali ibn Abi Thalib (r. 656-661), who “consulted their 
disciples and followers and implemented the majority’s opinions, even where 
it was against their own convictions.” Such practice, according to Bazargan, is 
an evident illustration of the “Islamic system of government” which signifies 
the principle of people’s participation in their own affairs, their self-
determination, and the “national sovereignty.” The hadith that states: “Every 
one of you is a shepherded [of the community], and all are responsible for 
their dependents and herd,” is considered to be an expression of a “reciprocal 
social responsibility and public involvement,” and the principle of 
democracy—”sovereignty of the people over the people” [eleven centuries 
before Europe!—emphasis added]. Islamic government, in the eyes of 
Bazargan, cannot help but be at once “consultative, democratic, and divinely 
inspired” (cf. Sachedina 2000). Thus, in the concept of Islamic government, 
Bazargan reasserts, the relations among individuals and rule are predicated 
upon “relative shared freedom and mutual responsibility”.39  
Bazargan’s viewpoints with regard to freedom and the “ideal type” of 
Islamic government as I illustrate above seem to criticize two camps: (1) post-
revolutionary Iranian regime which overemphasize the role clergy within 
religious and political system, along with its Mullahs who have functioned as a 
“go-between” of God like Catholic priests; (2) those who advocated the need 
______________ 
38 Ibid., p.p 79-80. 
39 Ibid., p. 79, cf. Saeed Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of 
Mehdi Bazargan,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 21 (1), 1994, pp. 85-101. 
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for “importing” Christian Reformation of Europe within Islam and Iranian 
contexts (e.g. Afghani and Shari’ati). For Bazargan, since Islam is in inherently 
liberal, democratic, pluralist, and egalitarian, there is no need to mimic such 
Reformation. These Bazargan’s views, to some degree, resemble those of 
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who has been considered to be the founder 
of Islamic modernism.40 However, it does not mean that Bazargan did not 
agree with the ideas of Islamic reformation echoed by his colleagues and 
predecessors. In other words, for Bazargan, the call for, let’s say “Islamic 
Protestantism,” must come “from within” by reinterpreting the spirits of 
progressive and humanistic views of Islam and the Qur’an that has been 
hijacked by Islamist groups and undemocratic clerics.41 
The arguments developed by Bazargan, especially with regard to the 
perspective of Christian reformation, slightly differ from those of Hashem 
Aghajari (b. 1957), another significant figure of Iranian reformers in the 
aftermath of the 1979 “Islamic Revolution” whose contributions to the 
notions of Islamic reformation have given major impacts on Iranian Shi’i 
communities. I will first briefly review Aghajari’s speeches42 I mention in the 
introduction of this article which has had a sort of “domino effects” with 
regard to the need of Islamic reform within Muslim world. There are several 
essential and “revolutionary” ideas delivered by Aghajari, a former history 
professor at Tarbiat Modares University, in his talks regarding the notions of 
Islamic reformation that provide a good introduction of analyzing the ground-
______________ 
40 cf. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, p. 130-160. 
41 I have explained elsewhere my criticism toward the reformists’ or the modernists’ points of 
view with regard to their notions of Islamic reformation since the nineteenth century which basically 
their ideas of “reformation” mean “purification” and “perfection” of Islam. Here I call these “reformist 
groups” the “apologist Muslims” who defended the Islamic system of beliefs from the onslaught of 
orientalism, westernization, and modernity by simultaneously emphasizing the compatibility and 
supremacy of Islam. A large number of reformist groups responded to the intellectual challenges 
coming from the West by adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such fictions avoided 
any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines and traditions, and celebrated the imagined perfection of 
Islam. A common apologist argument was that any modern institutions and concepts including 
democracy, freedom, feminism, pluralism, and many more, were first and foremost invented by 
Muslims and had already existed within Islam (see more Qurtuby, 2008: cf. Khaled Abou el-Fadl, 
“Islam and the Theology of Power.” Middle East Report, No. 221, 2001, p. 28-33. and see also Khaled 
Abou el-Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, (New York: Harper San Francisco, 
2005). 
42 For his complete speech see http://news.gooya.com/2002/07/02/0207-22.php. See also a 
brief summery of it in Ayelet Savyon, “The Call for Islamic Protestantism: Dr. Hashem Aghajari’s 
Speech and Subsequent Death Sentence,” The Middle East Media Research Institute Special Dispatch 
Series, 445, December 2, 2002. 
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breaking conception of Islamic Protestantism. One of the main ideas he 
proposed is the separation between “core Islam” and “traditional Islam.” 
Aghajari maintains that an essential element of the “core Islam” is the concept 
of Islamic humanism which grants equal rights of human beings regardless of 
their religious affiliations, beliefs, gender, races, countries, and so forth. 
Throughout his speeches he underscores the significance of human rights as 
an integral part of the “core Islam.” He said that the heart of Islam is the 
recognition that all humans have inalienable rights. While he urged Muslims 
to preserve the “core Islam,” he suggested them to set aside the “traditional 
Islam” which he defines as an outcome of Muslim experiences and 
engagements with particular localities, cultures, and traditions throughout 
generations and history after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (d. 632). 
Since “traditional Islam” is a sort of historical additions to the “core Islam,” 
Aghajari has argued, Muslims are not supposed to obey it.  
The “traditional Islam” Aghajari pointed out includes Islamic scholarly 
works or writings of previous/classical Muslim scholars (ulamā’) through 
which Muslims usually base their religious practices and thoughts. For Aghajari, 
each Muslim has the same right to interpret the Qur’an and Hadith, as well as to 
conduct ijtihād (“critical thinking”) toward particular Islamic teachings and 
doctrines. In other words, such ijtihād is not a monopoly or privileged right of 
one particular group or religious leader and scholar. Here he criticizes Iran’s 
clerics which, according to him, have functioned as the “source of emulation” 
(marja-e taqlid) of Shiites, and as the mediators between God and Muslims. 
Aghajari maintained that a system of clergy is a politically constructed recent 
historical product (ca. 50 or 60 years ago) since such a clerical class was absent 
during the Safavid dynasty. He likened such clergy (more precisely echelon of 
clerics) with the (Catholics) Church hierarchy (pope, bishops, cardinals, and 
priests) which need to be abolished since it has blockaded direct 
communication between a Muslim with his/her God.  
Besides criticizing a class of religious leaders (e.g. hujjat al-Islām, mujtahīd, 
ayatollah) and clergy institutions, he also spoke against the principle of 
emulation (taqlīd) through which Shiites have always been enslaved and 
“invaded” by the clerics’ interpretation so that they have never built up 
independent thought. Aghajari proposed the ideal connection between the 
clerics and ‘ordinary’ Muslims resemble teacher and disciple, and not master-
servant or leader-follower as it occurs in present-day Iran.  
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The most controversial idea he presented in his speeches certainly that 
of Islamic Protestantism. He described “Islamic Protestantism” as a type of 
Islam characterized by rational, scientific, humanistic, thoughtful, intellectual, 
and open-minded (Savyon, 2002). Just as the Protestant Reformation “wanted 
to rescue Christianity from the clergy and the church hierarchy,” the call for 
Islamic Protestantism in modern Iran, as Aghajari has argued, wanted to 
release Islam and Iranian Muslims from the political domination and religious 
cooptation of the Iranian ruling clerics.43 Aghajari, moreover, maintains that 
today’s Iran’s religious and political structures shared similarities with 
Christianity before the Protestant Reformation took place, i.e. the dominant 
and hegemonic role of clergy, and hierarchical, corrupt religious institutions. 
Charles Kurzman argue that the 1979 Iranian revolution “has had effect of 
transforming Shi’i religious scholars into a hierarchical institution with 
administrative authorities that even many Iranians regularly compare to the 
church and clergy in Catholic Christianity”.44  
Indeed, as Kurzman correctly pointed out, the type of religious hierarchy 
in Iran was regarded by Aghajari as a “copy-paste” or perfect replication of 
the Church hierarchy in medieval Christianity prior to the Martin Luther-led 
Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century of Europe. Specifically, 
Aghajari accused Iranian Shi’i clerics wanted to construct Catholic-style 
religious divisions and hierarchies. Hence he argued that the Iranian clerical 
hierarchy resembles the Catholic religious systems rather than the Islamic 
creed. This is the reason why he proposed to “break the clergy’s monopoly on 
Islam and Iranian Muslims”.45  
Abdulkarim Soroush46 his real name is reported to be Farajollah (or 
Hosayn) Dabbagh, is another leading spokesperson of the ideas of present-day 
Iranian Islamic reformation. He is also one of the most controversial thinkers 
and iconic intellectual in today’s Iran. Born in Tehran in 1945, he grew up in a 
traditional religious family and then continued to study in England where he 
______________ 
43 Ibid. cf. Sukidi, “The Travelling Idea of Islamic Protestantism….  
44 Browers and Kurzman, An Islamic Reformation? p. 11. 
45 Sukidi, op. cit., p. 408. cf. Ayelet Savyon, “The Call for Islamic Protestantism: Dr. Hashem 
Agsjari’s Speech and Subsequent Death Sentence.” The Middle East Media Research Institute Special 
Dispatch Series, No. 445 (December 2), 2002. 
46 For more information about Abdulkarim Soroush, visit his official website at 
http://www.drsoroush.com  
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had integrated the theories of Karl Popper, Willard van Orman Quine, Pierre 
Duhem, and many others into the framework of his enormous Islamic 
learning.47 Once had been appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989) to the 
Advisory Council on the Cultural Revolution whose main tasks were to “clean 
up” the universities of non-Islamic elements and then reopened them with the 
spirit of “Islamic Revolution,” Soroush resigned from the Council in 1984 out of 
displeasure with its work conditions and devoted his time solely to research 
and lecturing. “We no longer claim that a genuinely religious government can 
be democratic, but that it cannot be otherwise,” declares Soroush.48  
Since his resignation from the Council—actually since he spoke out of 
the Mullah-controlled Iranian reign—Iranian regime has harshly treated him, 
so do Iran’s traditionalist clerics. Since 1991, the attacks from influential right-
wing governmental clerics on Soroush have increased in number and 
intensity, accusing him of spreading subversive ideas and falsities. As a result, 
Soroush lost the reputation as, to borrow Buchta’s term, “philosophical 
darling of the Revolution” that he had held in the 1980s.49 Moreover, Soroush, 
studied chemistry at the University of London, is regularly threatened with 
murder and is infrequently roughed up by organized gangs of extremists 
known as Ansar-e-Hezbollah. 
 Indeed, Soroush was one of the main backers of the Iranian “Islamic 
Revolution,” and saw the Revolution as a vehicle of the “transition toward 
democracy.” Later he, also Bazargan, realized that the spirit of the 1979 
Revolution was hijacked by the country’s own clerical establishment, who used 
their moral authority to gain absolute power. One of the central targets of his 
criticism is the concept of velayat-e-faqih, which Chehabi and Keshavarzian call 
“the lynchpin of Iran’s theocratic constitution”.50 Literally means “guardianship 
______________ 
47 cf. Muhammad Sadri, “Sacral Defense of Secularism: Dissident Political Theology in Iran.” In 
Intellectual Trends in Twentieth-Century Iran, edited by Negin Nabavi. (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 2003), p. 181. 
48 Reza Aslan, No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and The Future of Islam, (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006), p. 253. 
49 See Buchta’s term on Wilfried Buchta, “The Failed Pan-Islam Program of the Islamic 
Republic: Views of the Liberal Reformers of the Religious “Semi-Opposition.” In Iran and the 
Surrounding World 1501-2001: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics, edited by Nikki Keddie 
and Rudi Matthee, pp. 281-303. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 294-295. 
50 H.E Chehabi and Arang Keshavarzian, “Politics in Iran.” In Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View, edited by Gabriel A. Almond, Russell J. Dalton, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kaare Strom, 
(New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), p. 463. 
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of the jurisprudence,” the velayat-e-faqih was preserved in the constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, and Ayatollah Khomeini himself, the 
architect of the principle, became the ruling jurisprudent. The constitution 
provided the faqih (at the time i.e. Khomeini, now Khamenei) with the power to 
appoint the head of the judiciary, to be commander in chief of the army, to 
dismiss the president, and to veto all laws created by the parliament. 
Originally intended to reconcile popular and divine sovereignty, the 
velayat-e-faqih thus had suddenly paved the way for the institutionalization of 
absolute clerical control. What post-revolutionary Iran experiences is a 
transformation of a cleric as a symbolic moral authority into the supreme 
political authority in the state.51 Soroush has not only been critical of the 
system of velayat-e-faqih but also Iran’s conservative clerics who have 
maintained undemocratic political systems. Once Soroush stated that no one 
should be paid for leading people in matters of religion; hence clerics must 
sustain themselves through other employment. His statement became too 
controversial, leading to angry denunciations of Soroush’s proposal in the 
press and threats from the highest ranking governmental authorities 
including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme religious and political 
leader, who publicly attacked Soroush’s ideas and denounced him as the 
opposition of the clergy like Pahlavi shahs.52 Furthermore, Soroush, author of 
the great academic book entitled The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of 
Shari’a, has criticized Islamic discourse which he sees as irrational and anti-
secularism. In this arena, Soroush has emerged as the most influential 
representative of today’s Iranian liberals who has advocated an important 
secularizing strain in present-day Iran’s Islamic discourse. For Soroush, Islam 
is open to different interpretations and therefore cannot be and should not be 
made ideological because ideology can reduce (the meaning and values of) 
religion.53 In this case, Soroush’s position differs from Shari’ati. Soroush once 
stated:  
______________ 
51 cf. Martin 2003; Babashi 1989; and Chehabi 1991. 
52 cf. Matin-asgari “Abdolkarim Soroush and the Secularization of Islamic Thought in Iran.” 
Iranian Studies 30 (1/2), 1997, p. 113. 
53 Soroush’s intellectual position is somewhat ambiguous here. While on one occasion he 
rejects an “Islamic ideology” (as Shari’ati did), at the other time he accepts the idea that religion 
(Islam) can be ideological since it can be enlightening and emancipatory, not merely justifying an 
oppressive status quo (for more detail, see criticism toward Soroush in Matin-Asgari 1997).  
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…a necessary prerequisite to democratization of religious government is 
to make religious thought more flexible by elevating the role of ‘reason’ in 
it; and that is not individual but collective reason, arising from the 
participation of all and benefiting from humanity’s experiences; and this 
is possible only through democratic means.54  
The term ‘secular’ here does not necessarily mean ‘rejection of religion’ 
but rather signifies worldly orientation and a critical or rational attitude 
toward religion, particularly with regard to clerical authority. Soroush’s focus 
on rational and critical philosophy is central to his contribution to the 
secularization of Islamic thought and a major step toward ‘bridging the gap’ 
between religious and secular intellectuals.55 Moreover, Soroush’s political 
philosophy remains close to the core of the liberal tradition, championing the 
basic values of reason, liberty, freedom, and democracy. Soroush continued to 
argue that these values should be promoted as “primary values” within 
Muslim societies and politics and as “independent virtues” not handmaidens 
of political maxims and religious dogma.56  
As I described earlier since Iranian regime has watched out his activities, it 
has been uneasy for Soroush to convey his critical messages with regard to 
changes within Islam and Iranian societies. Thanks to bimonthly journal of 
Kiyan. This journal became a crucial agent in spreading and breeding Soroush’s 
critical and rational views. Lunched in 1991, the journal soon became a forum 
for discussion on Islam, politics, and cultures among religious and secular 
intellectuals. Kiyan featured Soroush’s articles on secularism, democracy, 
freedom, individualism, civil society, clerical authority, religious pluralism, 
modern exegesis, literary criticism, and so forth.57 Focusing on the ideas of 
justice, freedom, and human rights within the theoretical frameworks of Islam 
and western intellectual traditions, Soroush’s enlightening articles have 
attracted and influenced many Muslim scholars, especially Iranian young 
generations. Freedom, for Soroush, is not merely an instrument of achieving the 
‘truth’ but is itself a truth. In his “Reason and Freedom,” Soroush states:  
Those who shun freedom as the enemy of truth and as a possible 
breeding ground for wrong ideas do not realize that freedom is itself a 
______________ 
54 Ibid., p. 95. 
55 Ibid., p. 103. 
56 Sadri 2003, p. 182; cf. Vakili, 1996. 
57 Matin-Asgari, op. cit., p. 100; cf. Vakili, 1996. 
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“truth.”….the world is the marketplace for the exchanges of ideas. We 
give and take, and we trust that the ascendance of the nobler truths is 
worth the sacrifice of an occasional minor truth: ‘As the barrel of wine 
shall last, let the occasional chalice break”.58  
Due to his passion on ‘rationalism’ and freedom of thought, many have 
assumed that Soroush is a neo-Mu’tazilite, a rational faction of Islam, with 
strong mystical tendencies. The American journalist Robin Wright even refers 
Soroush as the Luther of Islam (Journal of Democracy, January 1996) 
advocating “rational Islam” and Iran which free from religious cooptation, 
political tyranny, and clerical domination. Indeed, in the context of modern 
religious reform movements, Soroush’s approach is comparable to Martin 
Luther’s Christian Reformation (liberal Protestantism) in the way that both 
approaches have emphasized a non-clerical religion and rational re-
interpretation of the religious tradition and scriptures.59  
C. Closing Remarks: Prospects for “Islamic Protestantism”  
The idea of Islamic Reformation or more specifically that of “Islamic 
Protestantism” has been evidently advocated by those “Iranian Luthers:” Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, Mehdi Bazargan, Ali Shari’ati, Hashem Aghajari, and Abdul-
karim Soroush. Although they live in different socio-political settings and, at 
some point, differ in terms of religious thoughts and the detailed concept of 
Islamic reformation, they share the same ideas, namely the need to reform and 
“rescue” Islam and Iran from the “darkness” (al-ẓulumat) to the “lightness” (al-
nur), from the authoritarian regime to the democratic one, for the sake of a 
better life which accordance with human’s universal values and human rights.  
Among those Iranian reformers, to some degree, Soroush is quite different. 
Unlike Aghajari, who has produced little academic works, Soroush has written a 
number of enormous scholarly publications. Soroush also differs from his 
predecessors in the line of “religious superintellectuals.” The charisma of Mehdi 
Bazargan (also Yadollah Sahabi), for instance, emanated from their mastery of 
modern exact sciences while maintaining and revising their lay piety in the light 
of modern science. The vast fame of Ali Shari’ati was due to his powerful 
______________ 
58 Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, translated and edited by 
Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.  xiv. 
59 Matin-asgari, op. cit., p. 113; cf. Soroush 2000. 
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synthesis of the Shi’ite tradition of resistance with the revolutionary ethos of the 
French left in the sixties. Although Bazargan, Sahabi, and Shari’ati were at home 
with Islamic knowledge and tradition, they were routinely dismissed by the 
conservative clergy as unschooled in scholastics of the seminary. They were 
also accused by old-fashioned clerics as Western-educated heretics. Soroush, by 
contrast, cannot be ignored by the Iranian clerical establishment since he was 
trained for a long time in Iranian traditional seminary, and has mastered the 
classical canon of Shi’i theology such as usul al-fiqh (“Islamic legal theory”), tafsir 
(Qur’anic exegesis), and falsafah (philosophy). The ideologically correct scholars 
of the clerical institution “no longer challenge his scholastic credentials”.60  
Furthermore, although Soroush, Afghani, and Shari’ati have had similar 
enthusiasm with regard to “Muslim unity” or the idea of “Pan-Islamism,” 
Soroush strongly criticizes these two forerunners of Islamic reformation. 
Soroush, an admirer of the great poets Rumi and Hafiz, claims that both 
Afghani and Shari’ati from the bottom of their heart still saw the need “to 
convert Sunnis to Shi’ism in order to create an umma united under the Shi’i 
banner,” albeit they campaigned the equality of all Muslims and their equal 
claim to the truth”.61 Soroush calls Afghani and Shari’ati as the supporters of 
the “inner dimensions” of the Pan-Islamism meaning that the unification of all 
Muslims vis-à-vis outside foes is interpreted as the superiority of Shi’ites over 
Sunnis. Soroush, conversely, sees the significance of unity across the religious 
lines. Still, while Shari’ati was indirectly influenced by Afghani regarding his 
ideas of Islamic reformation (and Aghajari is influenced by Shari’ati), Soroush 
belongs to a new and sophisticated brand of Islamic reformation that has its 
origins in the works of Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938).62 Furthermore, 
Bazargan’s standpoints, as I mentioned earlier, can be traced to early modernist 
thinkers, notably Abduh (d. 1905).   
Apart from their differences, they have shared the same passion: the need 
for rational interpretations toward the Qur’an and for Islamic reformation by 
highlighting the significance of pluralism, secularism, freedom, and, above all, 
democracy. Additionally, they shared an enthusiastic approval of key features of 
______________ 
60 Soroush, Ibid., p. xii. 
61 Buchta, op. cit., p. 295. 
62 Muhammad Iqbal, author of The Reconstruction of the Religious Life in Islam, was a Muslim 
poet, philosopher, and politician whose poetry in Urdu, Arabic, and Persian is considered to be 
among the greatest of modern era. See more on Sadri, 2003, op. cit., p. 182. 
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“western traditions”: tolerance, citizenship cultures, freedom of expression, 
human and women’s rights, secularization, liberalism, and most importantly, 
democratic system.63  
Studying the shifting dynamics and transformation of the idea of Islamic 
reformation through the lens of those Iranian reformers’ thoughts and 
activities is fundamental since they have served as the carriers, transformers, 
and transmitters who functioned as an agent of knowledge and a vehicle of 
changing notions of “Islamic Protestantism” in Iran. By examining their 
thoughts and activities, we will know how the process of knowledge 
production and cultural reproduction of Islamic reformation takes place in 
different time and social settings. Anthropologist Dale Eickelman in his 
Knowledge and Power in Morocco calls this approach “social biography.” Such 
an approach, Eickelman has argued, allows a researcher to explore the 
themes of the study in contextual detail without losing view of more general 
issues of historical and social thought.64  
Somewhat different approach has been offered by Sukidi. Using Edward 
Said’s travelling theory, namely that the ideas and theories—like people and 
schools of criticism—travel “from person to person, from situation to 
situation, and from one period to one another,” Sukidi has argued that the 
notion of Islamic Protestantism has also travelled from Afghani to Shari’ati 
and finally to Aghajari.65 He maintains that the travelling idea of Islamic 
Protestantism from Afghani, Shari’ati, to Aghajari, has pursued what Said 
called the phases of acceptance, modification, and a new interpretation.66 
Sukidi argues that the idea of a Protestant type of Islamic reform posed 
by Afghani first emerged as a response of European imperialism. Afghani 
called for the Islamic Protestantism merely as a way to unite the strength of 
the Muslim world (Arab and the Middle East societies in particular) within 
the banner of Pan-Islam in order to defeat European colonialism. Afghani’s 
______________ 
63 cf. Keddie 1972; Kurzman, ed. 1998; Soroush 2000. 
64 Eickelman, Knowledge and Power in Morocco, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992, p. 
1-15. Eickelman uses an approach of “social biography,” focusing on a rural judge by the name of Hajj 
Abd al-Rahman (b. 1912), to analyze the shifting role and the transformation of an Islamic education 
from a mosque-based school to a religious institute—the Yusufiya—in Morocco.  
65 Sukidi, op. cit., p. 401-412. 
66 Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1983), p. 226. 
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concept of “Islamic Protestantism” had been continued by Shari’ati to react 
the increase of internalized colonial attitudes in the political leadership of the 
Shah’s regime. In the final phase, Aghajari built on the foundation of Shari’ati’s 
notion of Islamic Protestantism to counter the existing authoritarian Shi’i 
clerical establishments.  
 Unfortunately, in his article, Sukidi does not mention the significant 
contribution of two champions of Iran’s Islamic reformation: Mehdi Bazargan 
and Abdulkarim Soroush. As I explained above, Bazargan and Soroush—in 
addition to Afghani, Shari’ati, and Aghajari—have played a central role in the 
development of the idea of “Islamic restoration” in modern Iran advocating 
the form of Islam which is typified by rationalism, freedom, liberalism, 
equality, justice, and humanism. Both Bazargan and Soroush represent critical 
voices against the Shah’s regime and, most importantly, the Mullah’s 
authority in post-revolutionary Iran; consequently they deserve to be 
considered as the “Luther of Shi’a Islam” for their criticism toward Islam and 
Muslim societies in general and Iranian politics in particular.  
As the Iranian societies and politics have been controlled by 
conservative, undemocratic clerics and opportunist politicians, reform-
minded thinkers, ulama’, and activists like today’s Aghajari and Soroush have 
been facing serious challenges to implement their notions of Islamic 
reformation. However, it does not mean that the possibility of spreading such 
ideas has been closed. In an era in which societies have been more and more 
cognizant and clever, it is not impossible to bring such notions into reality. All 
will depend on how well those Iranian reformists in formulating, designing, 
and “marketing” such revolutionary ideas within Iranian marketplace. [w] 
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